Which path for the People Power Party: Goldwater or Nixon
2026.04.28 00:03
The author is a professor of political science and international relations at Jeonbuk National University.
With just over a month until the June 3 local elections, the Democratic Party is widely expected to win decisively. Some observers even warn of a collapse of the conservative bloc. Election outcomes are never certain until votes are counted, and a few regions may remain competitive. Still, there is little sign that the People Power Party (PPP) will mount an unexpected surge.
Among several factors, the leadership of Rep. Jang Dong-hyeok appears to rely heavily on a hardline base while clashing with moderates within the party. This dynamic has made it difficult to win back centrist voters who have already drifted away. The question, then, is what course the party should take. Insight may be found in the fortunes of the U.S. Republican Party in the 1960s.
Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon ran as Republican presidential candidates in 1964 and 1968. Though separated by only four years, their results diverged sharply. Goldwater suffered a landslide defeat, carrying only six of 50 states. Nixon, by contrast, narrowly won in 1968 with victories in 32 states, though he later resigned over the Watergate scandal after securing re-election.
In the early 1960s, when Goldwater was rising within the Republican Party, the United States was experiencing relative prosperity under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Unemployment was low, prices were stable and the middle class expanded. The national mourning following Kennedy’s assassination also worked to the Democrats’ political advantage. Against this backdrop, the Johnson administration was able to pass the Civil Rights Act. Centrist public opinion leaned toward the liberal party.
Goldwater nonetheless sought to become the standard-bearer of the Republicans' hardline wing, drawing on the support of staunch conservatives. He argued that “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice” and that moderation was not a virtue in the pursuit of justice. His emphasis on anticommunism, small government and military expansion alienated centrist voters further at a time when they were already inclined toward the Democrats. Although some regard him as a founding figure of modern conservatism in the United States, his Republican Party could not defeat the Democrats.
Socioeconomic conditions began to shift in the mid-1960s. While unemployment remained low and the economy had not yet entered a downturn, the prolonged Vietnam War and the Johnson administration’s expansive “Great Society” welfare programs deepened fiscal deficits and contributed to emerging inflation. Antiwar protests and rising prices followed, and many white working-class voters dissatisfied with policies perceived as favoring Black Americans began to turn away from the liberal party.
More decisive than these structural changes, however, was the difference in political strategy between Nixon and Goldwater. After Goldwater’s defeat, Nixon gradually incorporated elements of the Democrats’ progressive agenda. While emphasizing law and order, he also endorsed equal opportunity and expressed support for the spirit of civil rights legislation. On redistribution, he argued that Republicans could deliver more efficient welfare rather than simply defending small government. He also proposed that the federal government take an active role in addressing air and water pollution, an uncommon stance among conservatives at the time. In doing so, he opened a path for centrist voters disillusioned with the Democrats to shift toward the Republican Party. This repositioning helped him secure victory.
Korea’s current political environment resembles the United States during Goldwater’s era more than Nixon’s. While the socioeconomic contexts are not identical, it is difficult to deny that centrist sentiment leans more toward the progressive camp. If the PPP suffers a heavy defeat in the local elections, concerns about a broader collapse of conservatism may not be overstated. Even following Nixon’s path would be challenging under these conditions. Emulating Goldwater would be a far riskier choice.
Goldwater’s trajectory offers further lessons. Emerging as a leading figure of Republican extremism from 1960, he attacked moderates within the party, including those aligned with Nelson Rockefeller, as little more than copies of Democrats. In the 1962 midterm elections, which typically favor the opposition, Republicans lost amid internal divisions, particularly in Senate races.
Despite these setbacks, Goldwater focused on building a grassroots base nationwide. Within the defeated party, he consolidated his position and shifted blame for losses onto moderates, arguing that they lacked ideological clarity. Though the party lost elections, he secured the presidential nomination. Yet, as noted, he suffered a decisive defeat in 1964.
The real crossroads for the PPP will come after the local elections. It must choose whether to maintain a leadership style dependent on a hardline base or to pursue the more difficult but democratic path of appealing to centrist voters through credible policies and proposals. It is unclear whether refusing to change would one day position the party as a pioneer of a Korean version of neoconservatism. What is clear is that without change, the party risks repeated defeats not only in local elections but also in future parliamentary and presidential contests.
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
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